ABSTRACT
Introduction
Globally, millions of individuals have incurred substantial costs to migrate to places with more promising economic prospects; reasons for moving include the aim to obtain a higher income (Sjaastad, 1962; Harris and Todaro, 1970) or to escape economic risks at home (Stark, 1991) . This paper examines the extent to which mobile individuals and households gain from migration within an emerging economy in terms of absolute and relative welfare. We focus on the impact of internal (as opposed to international) migration in Kazakhstan using data from the Kazakhstan Migration and Remittances Survey (KRMS), a unique survey of individuals who moved from rural or urban areas to the major urban centers of the country. We believe this setting to be interesting for two reasons: First, the break-down of the Soviet Union was accompanied by a lifting of mobility barriers inducing a substantial emigration of non-Kazakh city dwellers. In exchange, ethnic Kazakhs suffering from labor market restructuring (especially due to privatization and unprofitability in the agricultural sector; see Wandel and Kozbagarova 2009: 40) moved into cities completing a substantial reshaping of the social fabric of the country's cities. The most extreme example of this social remodelling was the relocation of Kazakhstan's capital from Almaty to Astana in 1997 with the latter having almost tripled its population size since then. This move was expected to contribute to the urbanization of Kazakhstan, enhance the economy in the northern regions and spread wealth more evenly across the country. Second, Kazakhstan exemplifies some massive urbanization trends which can be found in many urban areas of rapidly emerging economies.
Both phenomena, the compositional change in Kazakh cities as well as the rapid urbanization process in general, can potentially be accompanied by social disruptions.
Newcomers to cities have to define their place in the urban society by signalling their status (Janabel 1996; Sivanthan and Pettit 2010) or by gaining costly access to social networks (cp.
Anggraeni 2009) while incumbents may not fully accept migrants (Kendirbaeva 1997; Schröder 2010) . Whereas most of the previous research on this topic stems from other fields (social psychology, consumer research), our economically motivated paper sheds light on these disruptions by analyzing the consumption implications of status signalling by newly arrived city dwellers.
We begin by comparing migrants' earnings and their perceived socio-economic status before and after the move and by comparing migrants' average earnings, household income and socioeconomic status to that of non-migrants in the destination city. The main 4 contribution of the paper is our analysis of status consumption patterns which clearly indicates that newly arrived migrants are concerned about their standing in the new environment.
In economics, earnings are usually treated as the primary measure of absolute economic success. Abstracting from moving costs, an increase of earnings after migration reflects a wise investment of a migrant's human capital. While the exact results from studies on migrant earnings vary, the literature has generally found a positive relationship between migration and earnings (Cooke and Baily, 1996; Dávila and Mora, 2008; Blackburn, 2009; Gagnon, Xenogiani and Xing, 2011) .
Another measure of a migrant's welfare is his or her socioeconomic status; this measure is more general and does not exclusively rely on financial well-being. Developed within the context of social stratification theory, socioeconomic status refers to the position of individuals or households in a hierarchical ordering of society and hence is a relative measure of welfare (Weber, 1946; Chan and Goldthorpe, 2007) . The status position is defined by a range of relevant economic and social characteristics such as income, education, occupational prestige and housing conditions, and it may or may not correspond to the subjective perception of an individual or household.
In the migration context, Stark and Taylor (1991) emphasize the importance of relative income in the decision to move in developing countries. They show theoretically that ex-ante relatively deprived households tend to send migrants abroad in order to improve their comparative income position at home. In contrast, the literature has been relatively silent about the actual welfare and status adjustments ex-post migration.
1 This is surprising given that the study of socioeconomic status is more than an abstract exercise: the subjective perception of socioeconomic status has been shown to shape subjective well-being (Di Tella, Haisken-De New and MacCulloch, 2010; Akay, Bargain and Zimmermann, 2012) and the state of health (Adler et al., 2000; Dalstra et al., 2005; Demakakos et al., 2008) . In one of the few existing studies on welfare and status adjustments ex-post migration, Resosudarmo et al. (2010) show that rural-to-urban migration in most cases improves the socioeconomic status of internal migrants in Indonesia. While the majority of migrants claim that their economic conditions are worse than those of their new non-migrant neighbours, in fact, their absolute expenditure levels exceed that of non-migrants. The authors attribute this observation to changing aspirations.
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According to the leisure class theory of Veblen (1899) , people with higher socioeconomic status tend to distinguish themselves from less affluent individuals by signaling their status through intensive status consumption. A higher socioeconomic position in the own reference group creates higher incentives to signal status. A growing literature in development economics clearly indicates that status consumption is not confined to wealthy individuals but also prevalent among some of the poorest households (Banerjee and Duflo, 2007; Brown, Bulte and Zhang, 2011) . Status signaling becomes even more important as the social cohesion of an individual's environment decreases and mobility rises. That is, more anonymous and frequent interaction with others-as is the case for newly arrived migrants in dynamic cities of emerging economies-makes status consumption a powerful tool to signal one's relative position (Kaus, 2012) . Accordingly, internal migrants might spend more on status consumption in order to define their social position. Such consumption has attracted substantial policy attention in poorer countries, as it may divert resources from other spending areas like health, education and housing or even create poverty traps (Kaus, 2010; Moav and Neeman, 2010) . While it appears difficult to prevent conspicuous consumption in practice through taxes (Christen and Morgan, 2005) or redistribution (Hopkins and Kornienko, 2004) , there is also a theoretical reason against status consumption regulation: Recent research has suggested that status consumption may be used as a means to acquire social capital, i.e. as a potential mode of insurance (Anggraeni, 2009; Danzer, 2013) .
Our paper presents evidence on the earnings of migrants and the socio-economic status of their households before and after migration ('inter-temporal comparison'). We show that recently arrived internal migrants report higher earnings and a substantially higher socioeconomic status as compared to before the move. Our main contribution, however, rests on the comparison of earnings, household incomes and socioeconomic status of internal migrants to urban centers with non-migrants at the destination ('inter-personal comparison').
Therefore, we estimate a number of regressions with earnings, income and socioeconomic status as the dependent variable that include regressors for whether an individual or household migrated to one of the sampled cities during four distinct periods of time. We find that recently arrived internal migrants report on average a substantially higher relative socioeconomic status than indigenous city dwellers. At the same, time they do not receive higher earnings or a higher household income, ceteris paribus. Digging deeper, we explore households' consumption patterns and show that recent internal migrants not only report a higher socioeconomic status but also spend a higher share of their expenditures on status consumption compared to their new neighbours. We argue that this status consumption is 6 used by migrants to show their post-move upward mobility on the social ladder. Several extensions to our main model suggest that migrant households try to impress their new neighbors and that they are indeed motivated by status concerns.
We are aware of the fact that internal migrants are a selected group of people that might differ from non-migrants. Instead of attributing a causal effect to migration per se, our goal is to describe an interesting pattern of income, status and consumption between immobile and mobile persons. As we also compare recent with former migrants and conduct several sensitivity checks, we are confident that these patterns provide evidence for the social adaptation of migrant-newcomers.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the history and current situation of internal migration in Kazakhstan. Section 3 introduces the dataset, Section 4 the modeling approach. Results are reported in Section 5, which first summarizes the inter-temporal welfare effects of migration, and then focuses on comparing earnings, income and status between internal migrants and their new neighbors. Section 6 investigates the status consumption behavior of newly arrived migrants and provides a number of robustness checks. Section 7 concludes.
Internal migration in Kazakhstan
Kazakhstan is the ninth largest country in the world but inhabited by a relatively small population (16 million inhabitants). Urbanization processes are still ongoing. Although internal migration in Kazakhstan is not as dynamic as in neighboring China, this country has recently experienced high population inflows into some of its biggest cities which is typical for emerging economies. These movements have been fueled by the relocation of the capital (Rowland, 1999) . After 2000, the economy in Kazakhstan returned to positive growth, driven by a booming energy sector and the implementation of institutional changes.
From 2002 onwards emigration diminished and the population of Kazakhstan began to grow.
3 The efficiency of the USSR's government in allocating its labor force and restricting the inflow to cities has been questioned by a number of studies. Lewis and Rowland (1979) argue that internal labor migration responded to economic opportunities and was largely unorganized until the mid-1970s. In her work on interregional migration in the USSR, Mitchneck (1991) shows that state institutions that allocated the labor force, such as the Organized Recruitment of Labor (Orgnabor), did not succeed in redistributing workers between surplus and deficit regions. Although the propiska system made it more difficult for Soviet citizens to move to preferred cities, these restrictions could be circumvented in a number of ways (Gang and Stuart, 2002) .
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In comparison to the huge population outflow in the first decade of Kazakhstan's independence, internal migration rates in the country have remained lower. This is remarkable since economic and social disparities between regions (oblasts) as well as between rural and urban areas remain very high (Dillinger, 2007; Aldashev and Dietz, 2011 
Data and Variables
We rely on data from the Kazakhstan Migration and Remittances Survey (KRMS), a new household survey that was conducted in four of Kazakhstan's biggest cities in 2010 containing 2,227 households Dietz, Gatskova and Schmillen, 2011) . Our sample is representative of the population in these four cities, namely Almaty, Astana, Karaganda and Pavlodar. All have experienced a high migration turnover over the past two decades; they have attracted a large number of internal migrants and have been important sending areas as well. For the purpose of our analysis we exclude all respondents with international migration experience resulting in a sample of 2,074 respondents of which roughly half reported having internal migration experience. 5 Table 1 summarizes the number of internal migrants and non-migrants for each of the four cities.
9 The survey collected information on a large variety of individual and household characteristics. For the purpose of analyzing earnings and status inter-temporally and for comparing migrants with non-migrants, we mainly rely on a set of indicators of individual and household welfare before and after the move to the current place of residence. Although our data are not longitudinal, the survey provides detailed information on the current and previous welfare of migrants and their households using retrospective information.
Our sample is dominated by male-headed households, which is typical for Central
Asian societies (Table A1 in and allow tracking past earnings quite accurately.
The socioeconomic status variable reflects the respondent's perceived position relative to others. The best-known method to measure the socioeconomic status is to ask respondents to place their households on some level of an imaginary social hierarchy or to choose one rung of a socioeconomic ladder which corresponds to their position in society. The scale usually contains between 6 and 11 rungs (e.g. Evans and Kelley, 2004; Powdhavee, 2007; Ravallion and Lokshin, 2002) . In our study we collect information on the location of migrant households on a socioeconomic ladder before and after the move. For this purpose, we use two similar questions: "Where on a ladder between 1 (poorest) and 10 (richest) would the household in which you lived in the last place before moving be located (just before the move)?" and "Where on a ladder between 1 (poorest) and 10 (richest) would your household be located in the place of residence, where you are living now?" Individuals without migration experience were asked to rate their status at their present place of residence only.
In the final part of our analysis we construct a variable that measures the share of total expenditures directed towards status consumption and compare the consumption patterns of migrant and non-migrant households. We argue that such status consumption is used by households to show off their relative standing in society. In our survey status consumption is measured as the fraction of total household expenditures spent on 'visible consumption' such as entertainment (including tourist trips, recreation, theatre, cinema etc.) as well as on celebrations and feasts (e.g., inviting neighbors, buying presents). The survey explicitly asks respondents to report these expenditures for a typical month in order to rule out one-off expenditures such as wedding celebrations. It turns out that 61 percent of households report positive expenditures on status consumption with an average (median) budget share of 4.6 (2.4) percent. 
Modeling Approach
In our regression analysis we intend to explore the determinants of individual earnings and household income, socioeconomic status and status consumption in four big cities in
Kazakhstan. In particular, we are interested in investigating whether internal migrants differ from non-migrants according to the respective welfare indicators.
Since earnings are defined on the individual level (and only available for survey respondents), the earnings model takes the following form:
The outcome variable y is the log of contemporary earnings of individual i. The main explanatory variables are related to migration experience. In the baseline regression, four dummy variables, migrant k with k={1,2,3,4} are used to distinguish four migration episodes.
Although individuals might have moved more than once we only consider a person's last move. More specifically, migrants are differentiated by the period of their move (before 1981, 8 Excluding zeros, the respective values are 7.7 and 5.7 percent. To rule out that some households might accidentally have included singular large-scale expenditures, we re-run our main regressions on status consumption excluding observations with expenditure shares of at least 50 percent (0.1 percent of households) and 25 percent (1.7 percent of households). The status consumption effects among recent migrants are even more precisely estimated and marginally larger when excluding these households (Table A7 ), suggesting that we present conservative estimates in the body of our paper. 1981-1990, 1991-2000 and 2001-2010) . Those respondents who have never migrated constitute the reference category.
The vector X controls for the respondent's socio-demographic characteristics and his or her human capital (age, age squared, gender, ethnicity, educational attainment), as well as for work and job related characteristics (status, sector, occupation and working hours). These variables are all measured with respect to the survey date. ĸ are fixed effects for 16 city districts that capture local labor market conditions and account for differences in in the costs of living, ε is the error term.
The individual earnings function is estimated with OLS regressions over all respondents who reported positive earnings (N=1,381). We also experimented with Heckman selection models to account for selection into labor market participation. In these models parental education, household characteristics such as the proportion of children in the household and/or the work status before the break-up of the Soviet Union (when labor market participation arguably was not really voluntary) were used as excluded variable. Generally, we found selection not be a serious issue and therefore only report the OLS results. Results from the Heckman selection models are available upon request.
Our general econometric model of income, socioeconomic status and status consumption is formulated on the household level. It looks very similar to the earnings model:
For the household level analysis, the dependent variable w measures welfare of household j. In different specifications, w either represents household income, the socioeconomic status of the household or the fraction of its expenditures directed towards status goods. Now, the β 1k s are the main parameters of interest. The vector Y controls for household demographic, human capital and wealth characteristics as well as the respondent's work status. The demographic controls are the ethnic composition of the household, the age and gender of its head, and the household's age composition (proportion of working-age and elderly adults and children in the household). The human capital of a household is now expressed by the proportion of adults with high, medium and low education. Apart from the income model, we also control for household wealth by current income and permanent income. The latter is proxied by housing and the ownership of assets (i.e. a property, a car or a 13 computer 
Results on inter-temporal and inter-personal welfare comparisons
We will now present the results of our analysis with respect to (i) the effects of internal migration on individual earnings and socioeconomic status ('inter-temporal comparison') and (ii) the relative standing of migrants compared to non-migrants at the destination in terms of individual earnings, household income and socioeconomic status ('inter-personal comparison'). Table 2 reports the answers of internal migrants to the question "Did you earn more, the same or less than in your job before the move?" It distinguishes between three groups of migrants: those who moved until 1990, those who moved between 1991 and 2000 and those who came to their current place of residence after 2000. As internal migration was subject to governmental control until independence, it is a priori unclear whether those who moved that early gained from migration. In contrast, we expect a majority of recent internal migrants to experience gains in earnings since economic motives have become the key migration motive.
Inter-temporal comparison
Indeed, we find that among recent internal migrants the share of those who earned more after moving was higher than among earlier migrants. Yet, in line with the previously cited literature that challenges the efficacy of the USSR's government in allocating its labor force, even a relative majority of earlier migrants enjoyed earnings gains after their move.
Overall, 48% of individuals who went to one of the four big cities reported an earnings increase, 34% earned about the same, and 18% earned less. Note that the average subjective socioeconomic status before moving was markedly lower among early migrant households than among more recent ones. Besides, internal migrants tend to rate their households higher on the status ladder than individuals with no migration experience. The last point leads us to the next step of our investigation: a more 15 thorough analysis of the relative standing of migrants compared to non-migrants at the destination with respect to individual earnings, household income and socioeconomic status. 
Inter-personal comparison
In column 1 of Table 4 we investigate whether monthly earnings in 2010 differed between migrants and non-migrants by including four dummies for migration status in a rather standard Mincer-type earnings equation (coefficients for all regressors can be found in Table A3 in the Appendix). We find that men, the better educated, older individuals, the selfemployed, and employees in the private sector and high-status occupations have significantly higher earnings than other workers, ceteris paribus. 11 Internal migration experience, however, is not significantly associated with earnings levels once we condition on demographic and job characteristics. This implies that we observe no earnings discrimination for internal migrants as compared to indigenous city residents.
To complement the individual-level earnings regressions with a comparable estimation
on the level of households, column 2 of Robust standard errors in parentheses.*, **, *** indicate significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Source: KRMS data; own calculations.
In the next regression, reported in column 3 of Table 4 , the household's current socioeconomic status is the dependent variable. Self-perceived status is a relevant outcome if it hints at a quest for status which might in turn be accompanied by behavioral changes, e.g. in terms of consumption habits. As the coefficients in the ordered probit model can only be interpreted with respect to sign and significance levels, marginal effects are reported in Table   A3 . This regression reveals that the proportion of household members with better education, the size of the home, asset ownership, and household income (per adult equivalent) are positively correlated with the subjective socioeconomic status of households in urban Kazakhstan. Interestingly, labor market participation is not significantly related to socioeconomic status, ceteris paribus. Russian households report a significantly lower socioeconomic status as compared to Kazakh and ethnically mixed households. This might be because of the decreasing influence of ethnic Russians in politics and institutions in Kazakhstan. Most importantly, we find a statistically significant status premium for the group of internal migrants that arrived in the city most recently. In 2010, the status of internal migrants who arrived before 1991 was not different from that of non-migrants. At the same time, the two groups whose members moved after 1991 on average held a significantly higher socioeconomic status. This finding indicates that the households of recent internal migrants tend to enjoy a significantly better subjective socioeconomic standing than other households. 12 As shown above, this cannot be due to higher earnings or income enjoyed by recent migrants because these do not differ significantly from those of their new neighbors.
Instead, other opportunities available in big cities might have a stronger impact on the subjective status of recent migrants than on the status of indigenous city dwellers and earlier migrants. Robust standard errors in parentheses.*, **, *** indicate significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Source: KRMS data; own calculations.
Results on status consumption and signaling
We will now explore whether the higher subjective socioeconomic status reported by recent migrants compared to their new neighbors goes hand in hand with comparatively higher status consumption. Since recent migrants have no significantly higher earnings and household incomes, we suspect that they reallocate their budget in order to signal higher status as a tool for establishing themselves and for adapting to the new social environment (Sivanthan and Pettit 2010). As mentioned above, a substantial literature on status signaling suggests that individuals or households consume in order to convey information about their status and that status consumption need not necessarily be related to economic resources (Moav and Neeman, 2010) . We assume that households derive socioeconomic status from expenditures on status items and entertainment and analyze the relationship between migration and status signaling. Migration implies a change in many dimensions of life so it is plausible that new residents try to 'define their place' in society through status consumption.
Because we focus on the fraction of expenditures dedicated to visible consumption and control for household income, our focus is on proper differences in consumption habits while keeping household income and the level of overall expenditures constant. (Table 5) . A plausible explanation for these results would be that status signaling is indeed part of the adaption process of newly arrived migrants. This explanation is in line with Table A4 in the appendix which shows expenditure regressions for 12 consumption categories (e.g., food, personal care, transportation): The only category on which recent migrants spend a significantly higher fraction of their total expenditures is the one encompassing status goods (with the potential exception of education, which is marginally significant). At the same time, they spend less on food and public services/utilities. The observed consumption pattern is also prevalent independently of whether the migrant household originated in an urban or rural area (Table A5 ) and independently of its ethnicity (Table A6 ). This rules out the possibility that our results are solely driven by more traditional consumers from a rural background.
We will now discuss the finding that newly arrived migrants spend relatively more on status consumption and at the same time report relatively higher subjective status in greater detail. Specifically, we will investigate whether migrants really show off to their new neighbors. We will also investigate whether migrants' status consumption can really be interpreted as a form of adaptation to the new social environment and whether the consumption patterns of migrant households are in line with status concerns.
First, one might argue that migrants do not intend to impress their new neighbors but rather their peers in the former place of residence. Although this possibility does not appear entirely plausible given the kind of status goods we analyze, we conduct two tests of this alternative hypothesis. Impressing the previous neighbors would only make sense if migrants either desired to return home or if they were strongly embedded in a social network that reached beyond their current city of residence. Our survey contains two questions that allow addressing these two possibilities directly. In a regression similar to equation (2) we interact the migration period dummies with a dummy variable that indicates whether a household 20 would like to return to the previous place of residence. If status consumption was used to impress peers in the previous place of residence, people who wanted to return should plausibly care most about their standing and spend most heavily on status consumption.
However, the results in Table 5 show exactly the opposite result, i.e. that people who wish to return spend no more or even significantly less on status consumption, ceteris paribus.
In the next step we test whether those with geographically wider outreach into their social network spend more on status consumption. We conceptualize the social network using information of inter-household transfers and interact-similar to the previous approach-the migration dummies with an indicator taking on the value of one if a household sends interhousehold transfers, and zero otherwise. The results in Table 5 suggest that those who have stronger transfer ties in general spend more on status consumption. At the same time there are no statistically significant differences between those recent migrants who send and those who do not send transfers. Overall, these two extensions lend credibility to the idea that households try to impress their new neighbors and not their peers in the former place of residence.
Second, if visible consumption is used by households to adapt to the new social environment we expect this effect to vanish as time since migration elapses. To provide supporting evidence for this view we give up the previous differentiation of time since migration (four period dummies). Instead, we categorize migrants according to their migration year into seven year brackets (until 1980, 1981-1985, 1986-1990, 1991-1995, 1996-2000, 2001-2005, 2006-2010) . The results in Table 5 show that only the most recent migrants spend a significantly higher fraction of their total expenditures on status than indigenous city- Third, we want to directly test whether the spending pattern for status consumption is consistent with the fact that households care about their socioeconomic status. In a standard status model, households belong to reference groups with known income distributions and 13 Not reported here but available upon request are regressions where we interact the detailed migration year brackets with our dummy distinguishing rural and urban settlements in the place of origin. These find consistently higher visible consumption for both recent urban-to-urban and recent rural-to-urban migrants. This is fully consistent with the general pattern of status gains presented here and shows that the results are not driven by rural-to-urban migrants alone.
spend their income on status (i.e. observable) and unobservable goods. Since socioeconomic status is derived from the consumption signal which the society receives through the status goods consumed by the household-conditional on the reference (i.e. income) group that the household belongs to-the following can be postulated (Charles, Hurst and Roussanov, 2009 ): if status consumption is indeed driven by status concerns, the differences in status good expenditures between households belonging to different reference groups will disappear once the average income of the relevant reference group is controlled for. 14 Charles, Hurst and
Roussanov (2009) and Kaus (2012) perform such tests based on racial differences in the USA and South Africa, respectively. In line with these applications, we add the average reference group income of migrant and non-migrant households in the current place of residence (defined here by city of residence and migration status) to regression 5 of Table 5 . The results indicate that the significant difference in status consumption between recent migrants and non-migrants vanishes when the average income of the reference group is controlled for.
Moreover, status consumption is negatively associated with average reference group income, just as predicted from a status concern model.
To sum up, all three extensions of our baseline status expenditure model support the view that migrant households care about their status position in the destination city and that their status signaling behavior slowly fades away as they adapt to the new surroundings.
Conclusion
A substantial body of research has found that internal migration to urban centers found that internal migrants not only report higher social status but also spend more of their resources on status consumption. This behavior is apparently chosen as a means to signal the migrants' achievements in the destination city and is likely to be a part of an adaptation strategy aimed at acquisition of social capital and at defining a place in the urban social hierarchy. Hence, migrant households show off to their new neighbors which might be welcomed if it gave them access to social networks, but which might theoretically be trapping them in deprivation (Moav, Neeman, 2010) .
In light of these results, it should be noted that Kazakh state officials have recently demanded to strictly control and minimize internal migration, as they expected these movements to result in poverty and social deprivation of newcomers (Interfax Kazakhstan, 2012; Tengri News, 2012) . Contrary to this reasoning and in line with the existing literature, our study shows that the majority of internal migrants to big Kazakh cities enjoy an intertemporal earnings and status gain after moving. Compared to their new neighbors, we find neither earnings discrimination for internal migrants, nor differences in household income, all else being equal. In absolute terms, internal migration provides economic benefits for mobile households. From a relative welfare perspective, however, migrant households gain little on objective economic grounds. Their adaptation effort in the form of status consumption has negative consequences for the consumption of food and public services/utilities. While regulating status consumption is on the political agenda in several countries, the available policy tools (taxes, bans, redistribution) do not necessarily meet their objective (Hopkins and Kornienko, 2004; Christen and Morgan, 2005; Danzer, 2013) . Even more fundamentally, it is still an open question whether status consumption is purely conspicuous or whether it should be seen more positively, e.g. because it is used as a means to generate access to social capital. Construction, mining or other sector.
APPENDIX
Robust standard errors in parentheses.*, **, *** indicate significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Source: KRMS data; own calculations. -2000 , Migration 1981 -1990 , Migration until 1980 , Proportion of household members aged 16-65, Proportion aged 65 or above, Proportion of adults with medium education, Proportion of adults with high education, male head of household, household size, ethnicity, home ownership, size of home (log of sqm), log of the total monthly household income in 2010, work status, years since migration fixed effects, city district fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Source: KRMS data; own calculations. Regressions control for: Proportion of household members aged 16-65, Proportion aged 65 or above, Proportion of adults with medium education, Proportion of adults with high education, male head of household, household size, ethnicity, home ownership, size of home (log of sqm), log of the total monthly household income in 2010, work status, years since migration fixed effects, city district fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Source: KRMS data; own calculations.
32

